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Abstract 
Judicial reform constitutes a sub-program within the Justice System Reform 
Program (JSRP) which is underway in Ethiopia since 2002. Its targets have 
been consistently articulated in the 2005 Comprehensive Justice System 
Reform Program, the First Growth and Transformation Plan and various 
strategic plans. However, the outcome and impact as, inter alia, manifested in 
public trust and confidence seem to be declining. The core problems in the 
Ethiopian justice system (including the judiciary) that were identified in the 
2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program were (a) gaps in 
accessibility and responsiveness to the needs of the poor, (b) inadequacy of 
“serious steps to tackle corruption, abuse of power and political interference in 
the administration of justice,” and (c) inadequate funding which “aggravates 
most deficiencies of the administration of justice”. As these problems still 
persist, I argue that future judicial reform pursuits require a new path which 
facilitates court-level and institution-level reform through grassroots 
empowerment including enhanced independence and resource allocation. 
Subject to justice sector reform harmonization, there should be an independent 
judicial reform which is not conflated with other components of justice sector 
reform. It is also argued that justice sector reform should not be subsumed 
under the Good Governance Reform Cluster which should rather be limited to 
macro-level harmonization of reform pursuits. In the absence of such measures, 
the various targets, aspirations and pledges for judicial reform may eventually 
end up in promise fatigue and regression. 
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Development pursuits envisage a predictable, coherent, efficient, effective and 
accessible justice system which, inter alia, ensures contract enforcement, 
(clearly defined, secure and easily transferable) property rights, access to justice 
and a normative and institutional setting in the context of good governance. The 
justice system is constituted of a legal and judicial system which are inter-
related and whose performance and effectiveness are inter-dependent. “An 
efficient legal and judicial system which delivers quick and quality justice 
reinforces the confidence of people in the rule of law, facilitates investment and 
production of wealth, enables better distributive justice, promotes basic human 
rights and enhances accountability and democratic governance”.1  
The 2005 Baseline Study Report of Ethiopia’s Ministry of Capacity Building, 
i.e. the Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program (CJSRP) 2 states four 
core components and a fifth crosscutting component of comprehensive Justice 
Sector Reform. They are (a) lawmaking and revision; (b) the judiciary; (c) law 
enforcement which includes prosecutors, the police and the penitentiary system; 
(d) legal education and research; and (e) information flow within and outside the 
justice system. 
This article is an overview of post-2002 reform pursuits in one of the 
components of the justice system, i.e., the judiciary. The first section highlights 
the political and economic factors that influence judicial empowerment.  
Sections 2 and 3 assesses the judicial reform pursuits since 2002 which are 
embodied in JSRP, in Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plans and in the 
strategic plan of federal courts for the GTP II period.  The fourth section 
compares the projects under the judicial reform sub-program that was underway 
during the GTP I period with the projects that relate to the judiciary in the 
strategic plan of the Good Governance Reform Cluster for the GTP II period. 
Section 5 briefly indicates the independence of the judiciary in a democratic 
developmental state, followed by the sixth section which highlights current 
public perception and trust in the judiciary.  The article can inspire further 




                                           
1 Report and Recommendations of the Working Group  for Department of Justice for the 
12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017), Department of Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, 
Government of India, September 2011. 
2 Ministry of Capacity Building, Justice System Reform Program Office (2005), 
Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program Baseline Study Report, February 2005. 
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1.  Factors toward Judicial Empowerment  
1.1 External-driven –versus- largely domestic judicial reform 
The law and development projects and pursuits of the 1960s primarily focused 
on legal education and the modernization of laws toward social engineering. 
They were meant to facilitate the ‘modernization’ of developing countries 
through the path undergone by the Global North. The subsequent thinking since 
the 1980s has espoused wider perspectives such as rule of law reform, judicial 
reform and governance.  As reforms that relate to rule of law including judicial 
reform envisage political will and the necessary domestic factors for their 
realization, most of the pledges and declarations expressed in developing 
countries do not match up with real achievements.   
As Santos observes, the USAlD identifies four generations of law 
programmes which prevailed since the early 1960s. “The first generation 
focused on legal education and law reform; the second, on basic needs legal aid; 
the third, on court reform”.3 The fourth generation “is the most ambitious and 
political in the Agency's terms because it encompasses all the concerns of the 
three previous generations of programmes and broadens their scope while 
including them in the design and implementation of country democracy 
programme”.4 
Santos recalls that “the semi-peripheral countries of Europe, Portugal and 
Spain lived under an authoritarian regime for four decades” during which “the 
judicial system was either reduced to an appendage of the government –in 
politically sensitive areas such as political crimes and labour disputes– or kept a 
low-profile independence and remained utterly isolated from society”.5 
Although the democratic transition of these countries in the 1970s brought about 
“large institutional changes in the judicial system”, it “took a decade for the 
courts to vindicate a more active role in society”.6 Santos notes that the nature 
and outcomes of judicial reform in the semi-peripheral countries in Europe was 
different from the judicial reform outcomes in the “semi-peripheral countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe” after their democratic transitions in the late 1980s.7   
The reform of courts in Southern Europe was mainly domestic, which 
reintegrates the judicial system with “the legal culture and the democratic 
                                           
3 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002). Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization, and Emancipation, Cambridge University Press, p. 326 (citing USAID 
1994, p. 18). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Id., p. 320. 
6 Id. p, 321. 
7 Id., pp. 321 ff. 
218                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                                December 2015  
 
 
tradition of continental Europe”.8 However, the reforms in various countries 
such as Latin America and Eastern European countries mainly resulted from 
exogenous factors rather than internal dynamic forces of change. In effect, 
Santos argues that “under these circumstances, the distrust of law and legal 
institutions cannot be remedied with quick-fix reform”.9  
This should not, however, undermine the positive role of external factors, 
because in view of the current global interdependence in various economic, 
social, technological, informational and political realms, judicial reforms indeed 
benefit from external interventions and support. Nor can largely external-driven 
reforms succeed because the effectiveness of institutional reforms mainly 
depends on domestic factors and internal dynamics.   
The role of domestic realities in judicial reform can be illustrated by the 
observations of Faundez in Kazakhstan regarding the adverse impact of “chronic 
political instability or faltering political commitment” which is “exacerbated by 
unrealistic and exaggerated expectations”.10 Even though “the objectives of the 
project was to strengthen judicial independence”, the project “failed to take into 
account that the political elites had no experience of constitutionalism and hence 
could not be easily persuaded to accept the notion of separation of powers”.11 
According to Faundez a more practical approach in the case of Kazakhstan 
would have been “less ambitious, but achievable intermediate goals”. It is, 
however, to be noted that the end in view was not problematic. Instead, it was 
the largely external-driven approach and inadequate attention to the objective 
realities that brought about the challenges in achievement because the most 
effective approaches are mainly domestic-driven reforms that can meanwhile 
obtain external support and partnership.  
1.2 Europe’s path to rule of law  
During the Middle Ages of Western Europe, informal institutions facilitated 
exchanges and economic activities. As Dam observes, one of the early European 
substitutes for rule of law in long-distance trade was community responsibility in 
which “city-states (communities) would hold all members of a foreign 
                                           
8 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1999). The GATT, Law and Democracy: (Mis)trusting the 
Global Reform of Courts, in J. Feest (ed.) Onati Papers 7: Globalization and Legal 
Cultures, IISL.  
9 Santos (2002), supra note 3, p. 322. 
10 Julio Faundez (2009).  ‘Rule of Law or Washington Consensus: The Evolution of the 
World Bank’s Approach to Legal and Judicial Reform’ in Amanda Perry-Kesaris (ed), 
Law in the Pursuit of Development, London: Routledge 2010. [Citing Kazakhstan (2003). 
Implementation Completion Report on a Loan (US $ 16.5 million) for a Legal Reform 
Project (World Bank)] 
11  Ibid. 
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community responsible when any member of that foreign community cheated, 
or failed to pay a debt to, a local citizen”. 12 In case “the foreigner refused to 
make compensation, goods of that foreigner’s compatriots within the local 
community would simply be impounded for the benefit of the local citizen. In 
effect, the presence of a debtor’s compatriots provided de facto collateral”.13  
Even though enforcement by a third party should have been pursued, “no 
appropriate third party was available where the two communities were not 
subject to a common sovereign. Neither Italy nor Germany had a single ruler 
because they were not unified states”.14  Similar practices of “community 
responsibility system played a role in England as well” because the centralized 
legal system created by the Normans only covered “the part of England subject 
to royal control through traveling judges” and “it was a costly and uncertain 
form of third-party enforcement”.15 As soon as such enforcement became 
possible, in England, the “Statute of Westminster I of 1275 outlawed the 
community responsibility system among communities within England”, and this 
practice was substituted by a voluntary registration system “in which debtor and 
creditor could jointly register a debt, thereby allowing designated local officials 
to foreclose on the movable property of the debtor in the case of nonpayment 
[FN10]”.16  
Boycotting was another means of retaliation against deceits in contracts. 
“Some guilds created what amounted to a multilateral system of boycotting 
foreign communities whose citizens cheated, stole from, or imprisoned guild 
members”.17  The more advanced system was based on reputation rather than 
boycott in which “local traders within a town could rely on local knowledge and 
experience based on past trading (in other words, on reputation)” thereby, inter 
alia, leading to trade through agents with reputation. Even after the emergence 
of the nation states of Europe (after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia), challenges 
in uniform and predictable adjudication and the vested interests of the monarchy 
rendered “the transition to a rule-of-law state in most countries” gradual and 
incremental, and in effect, this involved “an evolution over several centuries”.18 
Rule of law did not thus exist in Medieval Europe and it took centuries to have 
full-fledged development. This does not, however, render rule of law irrelevant 
                                           
12 Kenneth W. Dam (2006).  The Law-Growth Nexus:  The Rule of Law and Economic 
Development, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, p. 73. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Id., p. 74 citing Theodore F. T. Plucknett (1949). Legislation of Edward I. Oxford 
University Press, pp. 138–43. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Id., p. 78. 
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for economic development because even if economic activity can take place in 
its absence, “rule of law is essential to the efficient functioning of a modern 
economy”.19 
Unlike Europe’s experience, centuries of evolution toward rule of law were 
not necessary in the USA, Canada and Australia which transplanted it from 
Europe. The same holds true for other countries subject to the caveat that while 
USA, Canada and Australia were largely countries in which European 
settlements were predominant, other states which transplanted rule of law had 
different settings that enhanced the challenges in and complexities of the 
pursuits.  
1.3 Political and economic challenges in judicial empowerment 
Judicial independence involves “judicial budget autonomy, the existence of a 
uniform appointment system, stable terms, disciplinary system for court 
personnel, and adequate salaries and retirement benefits for judges”.20 To this 
end, judicial reform programs include “transparent methods of appointment, 
removal and supervision … in order to ensure personal and functional 
independence for judges”.21 
In developing countries and other transitional systems, there are two major 
challenges in rule of law and judicial reform pursuits. The first challenge relates 
to the interest of political groups while the second is attributable to resources.  
Carothers states that the “primary obstacles to such reform are not technical or 
financial, but political and human. Rule-of-law reform will succeed only if it 
gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law”.22   
Respect for the law will not easily take root in systems rife with corruption 
and cynicism, since entrenched elites cede their traditional impunity and 
vested interests only under great pressure. Even the new generations of 
politicians arising out of the political transitions of recent years are reluctant 
to support reforms that create competing centers of authority beyond their 
control.23 
Magalhães notes that “judicial institutions in emergent democracies are 
shaped primarily by the strategies of dominant political actors who attempt to 
maximize the congruence of the judiciary with their interests and its 
                                           
19 Id., p. 72 
20 Maria Dakolias (1996). The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean Elements 
of Reform, The World Bank, Washington DC, p. 20. 
21 Ibid 
22 Thomas Carothers (2006). ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, in Prompting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: in Search of Knowledge, Carothers ed., Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment 
for Peace, p. 4. 
23 Ibid. 
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responsiveness to their priorities”.24  Political actors who are in power have 
vested interest in “the likelihood of judicial decisions that favor their interests”. 
To this end, they use the “rules regarding the management of judicial careers” in 
order to “influence the responsiveness of judiciaries to dominant political 
actors”. The influence of the executive in judicial careers includes promotion, 
assignment and recall that “can be used to condition judicial behavior”.25 
In culturally divided polities, traditionally hegemonic groups can have 
interest in promoting judicial empowerment. This is because rule of law and 
empowered judiciary can be effective safeguards against prospective pressure 
by political actors with majority control of executive and legislative state power. 
Based on the assessment of  “the political vectors behind constitutional reform 
in Israel (1992), Canada (1982), New Zealand (1990), and South Africa (1993)” 
and upon examining “the political origins of these four constitutional 
revolutions”, Hirshl observes that “judicial empowerment is in many cases the 
consequence of a conscious strategy undertaken by threatened political and 
economic elites seeking to preserve their hegemony vis-à-vis the growing 
influence of ‘peripheral’ groups in crucial majoritarian policymaking arenas”. 
According to Hirshl, such “conscious judicial empowerment is likely to occur 
(a) when the judiciary's public reputation for political impartiality and rectitude 
is relatively high, and (b) when the courts are likely to rule, by and large, in 
accordance with the cultural propensities and policy preferences of the 
traditionally hegemonic elites”.26 
The first core factor in judicial independence is political will, because 
effective judicial independence requires the “de-politicisation of the process by 
which judicial personnel are appointed and removed”.27 Moreover, “the judicial 
branch should be financially and administratively independent from executive 
branch control” and the courts should be empowered “to declare executive and 
legislative actions unconstitutional”.28   
The second major challenge in the pursuits toward judicial empowerment is 
inadequacy of resources, remuneration and facilities that have adverse impact on 
                                           
24 Pedro C. Magalhães (1999). “The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe”. 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Oct., 1999), p. 43. 
25 Id., p. 44. 
26 Ran Hirschl (2000). “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through 
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions”. Law & Social 
Inquiry”. Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 2000), p. 91. 
27 Bruce M. Wilson, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Cordero and Roger Handberg (2004). “The Best 
Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-Gley: Judicial Reform in Latin America: Evidence from 
Costa Rica”.  Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Aug., 2004), p. 514.  
Footnotes omitted. 
28 Ibid. 
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the level of professionalism, integrity, retention and performance of judges. 
Europe’s experience shows causal reciprocity between economic development 
and judicial independence (in the context of rule of law and robust legal 
profession). However, developing countries are sailing through a global 
economy which necessitates rapid institutional reforms. The paradox is that the 
advance in institutional competence corresponds with higher levels of economic 
development.  
Chang states the role of institutions such as an independent judiciary in 
relation with “the functions that they perform (such as rule of law, respect for 
private property, government effectiveness, enforceability of contracts, 
maintenance of price stability, the restraint on corruption)”.29  He notes that the 
causal relationship between institutions and economic development should not 
ignore “the important possibility that economic development changes 
institutions”.30  Yet, he “does not deny the role of institutions in development 
but envisages a dual and reciprocal relationship between economic and 
institutional development”.31 
According to Wilson et al32 “the assumed link between the rule of law and 
economic development predates the current round of judicial reform” and it has 
long intellectual history as documented by “Rick Messick”.33 They state 
Messick’s observations that: 
this argument was first made by a fifteenth-century English jurist, Sir John 
Fortescue, later by the eighteenth-century Scottish economist Adam Smith, 
subsequently by the nineteenth-century German sociologist, Max Weber, and 
currently by neo-institutional economists such as Douglas North, all of whom 
outline the important link between a well functioning judicial system, the 
rule of law and free market economic development. According to this 
reasoning, which is currently accepted by international development 
agencies, any country following the rule of law reforms advocated by these 
institutions should experience free market economic development as 
predicted. 
Dam raises the same question whether independent legal institutions enhance 
economic development or the vice versa. In the context of the judiciary, he 
observes that with more money [that can be available in the course of economic 
                                           
29 Ha-Joon Chang (2010). “Institutions and Economic Development: theory, policy and 
history”, Journal of Institutional Economics (2011), 7:4, p. 485. 
30 Ibid, p. 476 
31 Elias N. Stebek (2012). “Ambiguities and Inconsistencies in the Prescriptions toward 
Development”. Mizan Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 319. 
32 Wilson et al, supra note 27, p. 508. 
33 Ibid, citing Richard E. Messick (1999).  ‘Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A 
Survey of the Issues,’ The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 14, N o. 1.  
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development] “judges can be paid more and be provided with … better libraries, 
thereby insulating them better against political pressures and the temptation of 
bribes”.34   
1.4  State legitimacy as a factor in judicial empowerment or 
disempowerment 
State legitimacy under absolute monarchy or communism emanates from 
political myth. While the absolute monarch claims to be “Elect of God”, Marxist 
governments claim legitimacy from an ideology which pledges to resolve the 
contradiction between social production and private appropriation under 
capitalism, and in effect, the ideology advocates for working class dictatorship 
represented by the communist party.  Military regimes that usurp state power 
may attribute their legitimacy to the corruption, inefficiency and atrocities of 
earlier regimes, and they usually present themselves as provisionally 
indispensable during the path toward elections and democratization. These 
categories of governments have vested interest against judicial independence 
whenever such empowerment is in tension with their interests.   
There are some authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that influence 
the judiciary only in selected cases which they consider as ‘politically sensitive’. 
Where interventions in ‘politically sensitive’ cases are subtle, most citizens may 
not realize them.  Yet, the impact of executive intervention which is initially 
prompted by political interest gradually nurtures widespread corruption and 
influences the judiciary’s organizational sub-culture. Eventually, this corrodes 
the impartiality of courts and extends to court cases that purely involve private 
citizens.  
As judicial reform is an incremental process, its strength and magnitude 
depend on the ideas of and commitment to constitutionalism commensurate with 
the political, social and economic realities. Ideas “were critical factors driving 
judicial empowerment ([in] Turkey, Israel, Canada, and the United Kingdom)”, 
and they “were part of a wider set of forces driving judicial empowerment, such 
as the case of Spain, in which a process including opposition political parties 
was key”. 35  
Woods and Hilbink further observe that “rational-strategic approaches have 
tended to emphasize politicians' or judges' abilities to read the implications of 
current events for predicted changes in the future”.36  In addition to such 
possibilities, “those who supply judicial empowerment may do so reactively, as 
                                           
34 Dam, supra note 12, p. 52. 
35 Patricia J. Woods & Lisa Hilbink (2009).  ‘Comparative Sources of Judicial 
Empowerment: Ideas and Interests’. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Dec., 
2009), p. 750. 
36 Ibid. 
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a response to past experiences that they want to prevent from reoccurring”.37 
Woods and Hiblink suggest that “judicial empowerment is a process that often 
occurs over time rather than through discrete, momentary changes”.38  
A case in point is the change that is underway in China’s judiciary. China 
does not claim state legitimacy from constitutional democracy, but from the 
ideology of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” which blends communism 
with market economy. Yet, there are trends of change in the scope of judicial 
functions mainly owing to the demands of economic activities.  For example, 
China’s rating in contract enforcement (according to the June 2015 World Bank 
data) is commendable. 
According to Peerenboom, courts in China “handle more than 8 million cases 
a year” and judicial independence “is not an issue in many cases, nor is the 
source, likelihood, or impact of interference the same across cases”.39 As 
Peerenboom observes, China pursues “a two-track approach to legal 
development that emphasizes commercial law while imposing limits on the 
exercise of civil and political rights”.  In this regard, he notes the need to identify 
the “costs of this gradualist approach” and poses questions whether China will 
“be able to maintain and deepen the reform agenda”, or whether the reform 
process will “stall, leaving China another example of a dysfunctional middle-
income state that once showed great promise”.40 
Ji Weidong raises a similar question regarding the way forward in China and 
observes that China is at cross-roads. He suggests that “the critical nexus of 
institutional designing of good governance is an independent judiciary following 
the principle of procedural fairness”.41  
[I]t is necessary for China to first establish the courts' authority through 
judicial reforms, laying the institutional foundation of rule-of-law. … More 
importantly, an independent judiciary functions as a neutral arbiter of 
conflicting interest groups and a third-party enforcer of contracts, which 
enhances the predictability of market transactions and safeguards fair 
competition. Compared with structural shift of political power, judicial 
reform is relatively less difficult and more practical. … This roadmap, of 
                                           
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid. 
39 Randall Peerenboom, in Judicial Independence in China. R. Peerenboom, Editor (2010),  
Cambridge University Press. (citing Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to 
the West or Model for the Rest? (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
pp. 3, 4 
40 Id., p. 4. 
41 Ji Weidong (2013), ‘The Judicial Reform in China: The Status Quo and Future 
Directions’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2013), p. 185. 
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course, has preconditions, that is, that the ruler has adequate practical 
rationality and that society reaches consensus on rule-of-law.42 
In the Ethiopian context, the roadmap is already articulated in the FDRE 
Constitution which expressly provides for rule of law and judicial independence.  
The preamble of the Constitution, inter alia, declares a “political community 
founded on the rule of law”. The Constitution guarantees an independent 
judiciary (Art. 78/1), and states that judicial powers are vested in the courts (Art. 
79/1). According to Article 79(2), “Courts of any level shall be free from 
interference of influence of any governmental body, governmental official or 
from any other source.”  Article 79(3) further guarantees judicial independence 
by providing that “Judges shall exercise their functions in full independence and 
shall be directed solely by law”.  Steady pursuits toward rule of law and judicial 
reform that target at the attainment of the standards enshrined in the Constitution 
are among the duties of the state. These pursuits are not thus options or 
executive discretions in Ethiopia, but mandatory constitutional guarantees which 
are among the factors that determine state legitimacy.   
1.5  Rule of law –versus- rule by law 
The United Nations Security Council defines rule of law as “a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards”.  UNSC’s definition further 
requires “measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of 
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”.43 It is this 
roadmap of rule of law and judicial independence that Ethiopia has pledged to 
pursue under the 1995 FDRE Constitution.   
In spite of Peerenboom’s arguments (highlighted earlier) regarding China’s 
march in the ‘rule of law’ landscape, what China can utmost attain (under its 
current ideology) is ‘rule by law’ rather than ‘rule of law’.  As Carothers 
observes: 
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public 
knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They 
enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as 
                                           
42 Ibid. 
43 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies (2004), UN Doc 
S/2004/106, para. 6. 
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universal human rights over the last half-century. … The central institutions 
of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably 
fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not 
subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the 
government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials 
accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government 
seeks to be law-abiding.44 
Carothers criticizes the narrow scope of ‘rule by law’ in regimes which 
“focus on the regular, efficient application of law but do not stress the necessity 
of government subordination to it. In their view, the law exists not to limit the 
state but to serve its power”. 45  He states that this narrow conception is more 
accurately “characterized as rule by law rather than rule of law”.46   
Moustafa and Ginsburg argue that in the efforts of authoritarian regimes for 
legitimacy they “often seek to justify their continued rule through the 
achievement of substantive outcomes, such as income redistribution, land 
reform, economic growth or political stability in post-conflict environments”. 
According to Mustafa and Ginsburg, such authoritarian rulers “may also attempt 
to make up for their questionable legitimacy by preserving judicial institutions 
that give the image, if not the full effect, of constraints on arbitrary rule”.47  
They further note that such states may strive to make use of courts to “maintain 
social control, attract capital, maintain bureaucratic discipline, adopt unpopular 
policies, and enhance regime legitimacy”.48   
Courts under such regimes may “also have the potential to open a space for 
activists to mobilize against the state” 49, and synergistic alliances sometimes 
form with judges who also wish to expand their mandate and affect political 
reform”. Under such circumstances, “authoritarian rulers work to contain 
judicial activism through providing incentives that favor judicial self-restraint, 
designing fragmented judicial systems, constraining access to justice, and 
incapacitating judicial support networks”.50 However, such efforts “may not be 
completely effective” and may cause “a lively arena of contention” out of what 
seems to be “the least likely environment for the judicialization of politics”.51  
                                           
44 Carothers, supra note 22, p. 4. 
45 Id., p. 5. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, eds. (2008).  Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press (Introduction: The Functions of 
Courts in Authoritarian Politics, by Moustafa & Ginsburg, p. 5). 
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2. Post-2002 Justice System Reform Pursuits under JSRP 
and GTP I  
2.1 Justice system reform initiatives and challenges, 2002-2005 
Ethiopia’s Justice System Reform Program (JSRP) “was established in 2002, 
under the authority of the Ministry of Capacity Building, to assess the 
performance of the various institutions of justice and to propose appropriate 
reforms”.52  At the outset of the reform initiatives, a workshop was organized by 
the Ministry of Capacity Building which had 166 participants drawn from 
various stakeholders and international experts in the field. 53  As Anne Lise 
Sibony noted during her presentation at the workshop, assessment of justice 
reform “is about measuring outcomes, impact of policies as opposed to mere 
measurement of inputs (funds invested, number of people working on a 
programme) or output (e.g. number of cases handled, number of hours taught in 
an education programme)”.54  
Based on the experience of State courts in the United States, she states the 
most comprehensive system for court assessment in the US, i.e. the Trial Courts 
Performance Standards (TCPS). It includes 22 standards that are covered under 
five areas of performance, namely (a) access to justice, (b) expedition and 
timeliness, (c) equality, fairness and integrity, (d) independence and 
accountability, and (e) public trust and confidence.55  Even though the twenty-
two measurement standards in TCPS cannot be readily used in all countries, 
they provide “a methodology to assess the actual functioning of courts”.56  
These measurement standards assess “a wide range of aspects, from very 
material ones, such as audibility of court debates to more substantial ones such 
as the conformity of rulings with the law”. They cover “the organizational 
quality of the courts” and further assess “personal and professional quality of 
judges and staff and substantial quality of court work”.57 These standards can 
indeed be customized to the objective realities of various settings. It must, 
meanwhile, be noted that the five areas of performance under TCPS are 
embodied in the vision, mission and values of Ethiopian courts stated in Section 
4.3 of this article.   
Sibony notes the criticisms against comparing performance among courts and 
she states that the assessment does not negate the independence of the judiciary 
                                           
52 CJSRP, supra note 2, p. 48. 
53 Ministry of Capacity Building, Justice Reform System in Ethiopia: Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Ethiopia’s Justice System Reform, Africa Hall, 7-8 May 2002, pp. 205-211. 
54 Id., p. 74. 
55 Id., p. 76. 
56 Id., p. 77. 
57 Ibid. 
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because the standards “were elaborated by a commission consisting of a 
majority of judges (including a court administrator and a few academics), and 
[because they are] meant to be implemented by the courts.” She further 
indicated that “the results are not intended to be known to the executive 
branch”.58  This does not, however, mean that courts will be non-transparent, 
and this statement merely indicates that reporting to the executive branch is not 
among the targets of court assessments.  
The 2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program was an outgrowth 
of the Justice System Reform Program which was formulated in 2002. “In a 
document published in April 200259, the JSRP identified a number of major 
problems hindering the machinery of justice”. The document looks into the 
justice system as a coherent whole and it notes that “fragmented and piecemeal 
approaches in reforming and building the capacity of justice institutions could 
not solve all problems and bring the intended results”. 60  To this end it calls for 
“effective resource utilisation in the sector” which can “be achieved by working 
towards a comprehensive justice system reform program”.61  
This holistic approach corresponds with the core themes stated in the World 
Bank’s “Initiatives of Legal and Judicial Reform”, 2002.62  It suggests the 
following: 
Laws must simultaneously incorporate world-class best practices and be 
tailored to the particular country. Wholesale importation of foreign laws 
cannot take root when the laws are alien to the culture and values of the 
people. Well-drafted laws themselves are not self-executing. Complementary 
institutions and well-trained staff must be present to implement those laws. 
The judiciary must have independent judges with the utmost professional 
integrity; law schools need to educate the country’s lawyers, making them 
better professionals; legal services must reach the poor and the vulnerable. In 
sum, these pillars are the underpinnings of a holistic approach to legal and 
judicial reform projects.63 
Two years later, the World Bank’s 2004 assessment on Ethiopia’s legal and 
judicial sector reiterated the need for holistic approach in justice system 
reform.64 With regard to the judiciary, the assessment mainly focused “on issues 
concerning the qualifications, training, and selection of judges, judicial 
independence and accountability at state and federal levels, and, to a much 
                                           
58 Ibid. 
59 Justice System Reform Program, Ministry of Capacity Building, Addis Ababa, April 2002 
60 CJSRP, supra note 2, p. 48. 
61 Ibid. 
62 World Bank (2002), Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, Washington DC. 
63 Id., pp. 15, 16. 
64 World Bank (2004), Ethiopia: Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment. Washington DC. 
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lesser extent, certain issues regarding basic court functions and administration”.65 
The assessment states that “In general, the judicial branch in Ethiopia suffers 
from dismal conditions of service, staff shortages, a lack of adequate training, 
debilitating infrastructure and logistical problems”.66  
It also notes a “long history of centralized governmental authority and a 
judiciary subjugated to the executive branch” that “has fostered a weak judicial 
branch with reduced capacity to exercise genuine independence, as well as a 
reticence of other branches to treat the judiciary as either truly independent or 
co-equal”.67 The assessment thus suggests the need to address and overcome 
“various practical and structural impediments to judicial independence”, and it 
identifies four categories of issues, namely, “constitutional decision-making 
authority in the parliament instead of the judiciary, the composition of the 
Judicial Administration Commissions, independence issues at the federal 
judicial level, and independence issues at the state judicial level”.68 
The 2005 CJSRP identified the following three core problems with regard to 
Ethiopia’s justice system including the judiciary: 
Firstly, it is neither accessible nor responsive to the needs of the poor. 
Secondly, serious steps to tackle corruption, abuse of power and political 
interference in the administration of justice have yet to be taken. Thirdly, 
inadequate funding of the justice institutions aggravates most deficiencies of 
the administration of justice. 69 
These challenges require enhancing access of the poor to justice, addressing 
the issues of corruption, abuse of power and interference in the administration of 
justice, and the need for adequate funding of justice institutions. With regard to 
judicial independence, the Baseline Study reads: 
The perception of the independence of the Judiciary is very low. The 
operation of the courts is managed and supervised by the court presidents 
who therefore act both as judges and administration officials accountable to 
the President of the Supreme Court. Potentially this compromises their 
independence. Besides, the process of selection and promotion of judges is 
insufficiently transparent and lacks inputs from other legal professions. The 
same can be said of performance evaluation.70  
The CJSRP states the gaps in judicial training, the weaknesses in case 
management, the substantial increase in caseload during the years that preceded 
                                           
65 Id., p. 10. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Id., p. 19. 
68 Ibid. 
69 CJSRP, supra note 2, p. 14. 
70 Ibid 
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the study, and limited access to all kinds of legal information.71 According to 
CJSRP, “the judges’ poor working conditions threaten their independence, 
reduce their efficiency and constitute incentives for corruption”.72  
Ato Mandefrot Belay who was head of the Justice System Reform Program 
Office at the Ministry of Capacity Building (during the initial years of the 
reform) had duly noted the following, regarding the pace and achievements of 
the justice system reform pursuits (which includes the judiciary): 
One of the main challenges in the implementation of the Justice System 
Reform Program has been its complexity and the desire to undertake many 
reform projects in a short time. Each of the five components of the program 
are wide in scope requiring change and reform in the legal framework, 
institutional arrangement, streamlining working systems and procedures and 
institutional coordination.  The Justice System Reform Program attempted to 
work on all these at once and in a short time. Annual implementation plans 
and accomplishment targets were often highly ambitious and sometimes 
unrealistic. [FN].73 ...  Big projects are usually difficult to manage and co-
ordinate and hence, tend to fail. Such risks are usually mitigated by starting 
small and progressing in phase. Although the JSRP has not failed, it has 
lagged behind in many of its components.74   
2.2  Elements of judicial reform under GTP I: Strategic directions, 
objectives and targets 
Section 7.3 of GTP I (2010/11- 2014/15) deals with the justice sector. It states 
the following strategic directions of the justice sector:  
The overall strategic direction for the justice sector is to contribute to 
establishing a stable democratic and developmental state. Contributions made 
by the justice sector in this direction, will be to establish a system for citizens 
to access judicial information and ensure that the justice system is more 
effective. Steps will be taken to ensure that implementation and interpretation 
of laws are in conformity with the Constitution; where they are not, they will 
be amended. The independence, transparency and accountability of courts, 
and of the judicial system as a whole, will be assured.  Law enforcement 
                                           
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 [FN 29] For example in 2004/2005 budget year, it was planned to implement all court 
reform projects in 721 court sites throughout the country. Actually, only 72 courts were 
covered in that year. Similarly, when revision of the codes started the plan has been to 
complete revision of all codes in two years. Revision of most codes has actually taken 
more than seven years.  
74 Mandefrot Belay (2008), “A Review of the Ethiopian Justice System Reform Program “, 
in Digest of Ethiopia’s National Policies, Strategies and Programs, Taye Assefa, Editor, 
Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa, p. 442. 
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agencies will be strengthened by strengthening human resource skills and 
adequate equipment….75 
During the plan period of GTP I, the objectives of Ethiopia’s justice sector 
were “to strengthen the constitutional system and ensure the rule of law, make 
the justice system effective, efficient and accessible as well as more 
independent, transparent and accountable”. 76  The objectives further included 
consolidating “the process of creating a democratic, stable and strong federal 
system that ensures peace and security of citizens”. 77 
GTP I stated categories of targets that were expected to be achieved during 
the period 2010/11-2014/15. It also had stated the implementation strategies of 
the targets. Although the categories of targets were stated in paragraphs, fifty-
three targets can be identified under the ten categories stated in GTP I.  Out of 
the eight targets that can be identified from the paragraph that deals with human 
resource capacity development,78 (i) pre-service training for newly appointed 
prosecutors and judges; (ii) short-term training “at least once a year for judges 
and prosecutors serving at all levels ranging from Woreda to Federal Supreme 
Courts” and other targets are related with the judiciary.  
The second category of targets under GTP I aimed at improving the 
transparency and accountability of the justice system.79 The third category of 
targets expressly and specifically referred to the judiciary. 80  The enhancement 
                                           
75 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010), Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11- 2014/15, Volume I, Main Text 
GTP I. English Version, November 2010, Addis Ababa, page 101. 




The six targets under this category addressed the independence, transparency and 
accountability of the judiciary. It pledged: (i) full establishment of a system that enhances 
transparency and accountability; (ii) establishing a mechanism to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the professionals; (iii) making ethical principles known and so that they 
can be fully implemented by the professionals involved; (iv) strengthening complaint 
handling offices; (v) establishing and implementing effective and cost saving resource 
management system; (vi) establishing strong monitoring, evaluation and support systems;  
and (vii) putting in place hearing process in fully open courts. These targets are generic 
and were thus applicable to all components of the justice sector including the judiciary.  
80 Ibid. 
The six targets under this category addressed the independence, transparency and 
accountability of the judiciary. It pledged: 
i) to establish  a system to ensure accountability, while guaranteeing the judiciary’s 
independence; 
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of service accessibility (six targets) constituted the fourth category of targets 
under GTP I.81   
The fifth category addressed seven targets on the rehabilitation of 
prisoners.82 The remaining five categories of targets of the justice sector under 
GTP I dealt with strengthening the federal system83  (seven targets); increasing 
public participation84 (two targets); improving sector communication 85 (two 
targets); enhancing the use of ICT in the reform process 86 (six targets) which 
include the establishment and putting in use a national integrated justice 
information system (NIJIS); and ensuring the mainstreaming of cross cutting 
issues in the justice sector 87 (two targets) with regard to rights of women, 




                                                                                                            
ii) appointment of judges based on competence and ensure fair regional and gender 
representation; 
iii) to expand the performance evaluation system for judges, ensuring the continuity of 
the evaluation system and improving the screening process; 
iv) to establish a system ‘for the speedy resolution of disciplinary matters that are 
brought before the Judicial Administration Council’; 
v) improvements ‘based on consultations with and contributions from service users and 
stakeholders’; and 
vi) timely availability of cassation decisions and laws to judges. 
81 Id., pp. 102, 103. 
These targets aimed at (i) providing ‘standardized accommodation in which justice 
agencies and courts can work in an integrated manner and which are more accessible’; (ii) 
expanding the ‘initiatives to provide the services of the courts throughout the year’ to all 
courts, and the provision of court ‘services 24 hours-a-day’; (iii) Full implementation of 
‘efforts that have been started to make the courts more accessible to women and children’ 
and expanding same ‘to all courts in the country’; (iv) expanding and implementing the 
‘initiatives that have been started to make the court environment friendlier for users’; (v) 
providing ‘adequate legal counsel, aid and translation services’ to indigent litigants; and 
(vi) increasing the number of judges to ensure that it ‘corresponds to the size of the 
population they serve.’ 
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3. Judicial Reform Components in GTP II  
3.1 GTP II’s evaluation of performance during GTP I 
The performance of GTP I is assessed in Part I of GTP II (December 2015),88 
under Section 5 titled Capacity Building and Good Governance (የማስፈጸም Aቅም 
ግንባታና መልካም Aስተዳደር). Subsection 5.2 (titled Developmental Good 
Governance/ ልማታዊ መልካም Aስተዳደር) devotes two paragraphs which 
specifically make reference to the justice sector. The word developmental as a 
qualifier for good governance seems to be redundant in accompanying ‘good’ 
because good governance naturally enhances and facilitates development. 
Adjectives qualify nouns and the usage of the qualifier ‘developmental’ to ‘good 
governance’ gives the inference that there can be good governance which is not 
developmental. 
One of the paragraphs in Subsection 5.2 that evaluates the performance of the 
justice sector during GTP I embodies ten elements out of which the last two 
elements89 specifically refer to the judiciary. GTP II identifies various gaps in its 
evaluation of the justice sector’s performance during GTP I. 90 These gaps relate 
to all components of the justice sector. The last two paragraphs of the sub-
section (i.e. Subsection 5.2) on good governance deal with the public service in 
general and the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission in good governance.   
The shortcomings of the earlier (April 2015) Draft GTP II are repeated in 
GTP II (December 2015) with regard to the evaluation of the performance of the 
                                           
88 የIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ፣ የሁለተኛው Aምስት ዓመት የEድገትና ትራንስፎርሜሽን 
Eቅድ (2008-2012)፣ ጥራዝ 1፣ ዋና ሰነድ፣ ብሔራዊ የፕላን ኮሚሽን፣ ታህሳስ 2008፣ Aዲስ Aበባ፡፡,  
      Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,  Second Five Year Growth and 
Transformation Plan (2015/16- 2019/20), Volume 1, Main Text, National Planning 
Commission, December 2015, Addis Ababa (Amharic version) 
89 Id., p. 40 paragraph 3. The two sentences which refer to the judiciary state that: 
- ‘The Constitution ensures judicial independence and at the same time makes it 
accountable in accordance with the law, and positive achievements have been 
accomplished with regard to judicial independence’.  
- ‘There are developments with regard to enabling the judiciary to be subject only 
to the law, and to enable courts operate free from any influence particularly 
interference and pressures from the executive, and at the same time free from any 
external interference or pressure’. 
90 Id., p. 40  para 4. 
The gaps include (i) problems regarding attitudes and professional competence; (ii) 
various factors that are attributable to corruption and gaps in impartiality which adversely 
affect justice and the rule of law; (iii) gaps in harmonizing the capacities of various justice 
sector institutions that have inter-dependent functions; (iv) the need to strengthen the 
justice sector institutions closer to the public in the lower administrative units; and  (v) the 
need to give due attention to enhance the accessibility, efficiency, transparency and rule 
of law. 
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justice sector during GTP I. The evaluation was expected to follow the 
classification of the fifty three targets of GTP I so that the level of performance 
and challenges could be objectively and clearly assessed.  
3.2 Judicial Reform Components in GTP II  
3.2.1 Targets in the earlier Draft GTP II (April 2015) 
In Part 2 of the earlier Draft GTP II (April 2015 version)91, the third section of 
Chapter 3 was titled ‘Major Targets’ (ዋና ዋና ግቦች). Out of the nine targets that 
can be identified from the second paragraph, the six targets were related to the 
judiciary. 92 Even though the element which had pledged to conduct research 
and implement “a judicial policy in tune with the concept of the developmental 
state” is omitted in GTP II (December 2015), it deserves attention. It is thus 
discussed in the fifth section of this article which examines whether democratic 
developmental statehood warrants intervention in the independence of the 
judiciary. Ten targets can be identified from the third paragraph five of which 
were directly or generally related to the judiciary. 93  Three out of the five targets 
in the fourth paragraph in the April 2015 Draft were also related to the 
judiciary.94  
                                           
91  የIትዮጵያ ፌዴራዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ፣ የሁለተኛው Aምስት ዓመት (2008-2012) የEድገትና 
የትራንስፎርሜሽን Eቅድ የመጨረሻ ረቂቅ፣ ሚያዝያ 2007፤ Aዲስ Aበባ፡፡ 
        Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic, Second Five Year (2015/15- 2019/20) Growth 
and Transformation Plan, Final Draft (Amharic version), April 2015 (Miazia 2007 EC), 
Addis Ababa . 
92 Id., p. 173.  
The targets that relate to the judiciary in the earlier April 2015 Draft GTP II were: 
-  ‘research and implementation of a judicial policy in tune with the concept of the 
developmental state that can serve the demands of a developmental state, 
developmental investors and citizens’; 
-  ‘research and putting in place specialized benches for cases that have significant 
impact on development’; 
-  ‘reduction of attrition rates and attention to summary and accelerated proceedings’; 
- ‘correct and enforceable judicial decisions’; 
- ‘publication and distribution of binding cassation decisions’; and 
-  ensuring that judicial decisions are in conformity with the Constitution.  
93 Ibid. 
These five targets were: (a) ‘increase in the number of decided cases’; (b) ‘reduce 
congestion of cases and the current level of case loads’; (c) reduce duration until judicial 
decision to at least below six months; (d) ‘adequate and effective performance by opening 
additional benches for cases that need particular attention due to state and public interest’; 
and (e) ‘sustain the tasks that are underway toward due process of law’. 
94 Id., p. 174. 
These three targets were: (a) ‘improve case flow management’; (b) ‘implementation of 
sentencing guidelines throughout the country’ and preparation of directives to that 
comparable sentences can be imposed on offences that are not covered in the sentencing 
Judicial Reform Pursuits in Ethiopia, 2002-2015                                                                    235 
 
 
3.2.2 Targets  in GTP II (December 2015)  
Part 2 of GTP II embodies Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan for the 
years 2015/16- 2019/20. The last theme in Section 7.1.4 embodies the five 
paragraphs which include the main targets of the justice sector during the GTP 
II period. Among the six targets embodied n the first paragraph, the third 
element which reads “Ensuring the independence, transparency and 
accountability of the judicial system and courts” refers to the judiciary, while 
the fourth element which states the need to strengthen “the capacity of justice 
system institutions with regard to human resources, knowledge, skills and 
equipment” applies to the judiciary and other justice sector institutions. We can 
identify the following eight targets under the second paragraph:  
a) Adequate legal framework required for development and 
democratization; 
b) Ensure rule of law through the implementation and interpretation of 
laws based on their purpose. 
c) Bring about institutional reform towards the attainment of [the 
objectives hereabove, i.e., democratization and rule of law] and toward 
the pursuit of accelerated and sustainable development; 
d) Establish public empowerment structures which encourage 
comprehensive public participation and enhance  law-abiding and 
peaceful citizenry; 
e) Efficient dissemination and distribution of laws to the public; 
f) Provision of efficient and modern judicial services; 
g) Tasks that strengthen the processes, organization and human resource 
toward effective justice system; 
h) In collaboration with the public, combat the tendencies of corruption and 
gaps in fair trial, and enable the justice system to win public confidence. 
The third paragraph of GTP II, Section 7.1.4 embodies the following three 
targets relating to human resource development, ICT Support and judicial 
independence along with transparency and accountability: 
a) Capacity building with regard to justice system institutions and their 
human resource, and building the human resource capacity of justice 
sector institutions in a planned and institutional approach through 
training to enhance capacity in attitudes, integrity, knowledge and skills; 
b) Enhance ICT support to judicial services, plasma services for court 
proceedings, expansion of circuit and other benches, court services 
throughout the year; 
                                                                                                            
guidelines’; and (c) ‘full implementation of the tasks that are underway toward authentic 
data on execution of judgements’. 
236                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                                December 2015  
 
 
c) Strengthen the tasks that are underway toward adequate independence, 
transparency and accountability of the justice system, with a view to 
ensuring the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, fairness, 
independence, transparency and accountability of the justice system.  
While the sixth and eighth items of paragraph 2, and the second and third 
items of paragraph 3 specifically make reference to the judiciary, most of the 
items in the paragraphs apply to more than one justice sector component, 
including the judiciary.  
4. Justice Sector Five Year Plans and Projects under GTP I 
and GTP II 
4.1  The justice sector’s Five Year Plan during GTP I : An overview 
The Strategic Plan of the justice sector for GTP I’s period 2010/11- 2014/15 95 
states the vision and mission of the justice sector. The vision of the justice sector 
foresees Ethiopia where “good governance prevails, human rights and 
democratic rights are ensured, peace and security prevails, rule of law is 
ensured, and where there is effective, efficient, accessible and independent 
judicial system with due accountability and public confidence”.96 As vision 
statements go beyond five-year plan periods it applies to the GTP II period as 
well.  The mission statement of the justice sector for the GTP I period was the 
following: 
The mission of the justice sector is to ensure peace and security of citizens 
and residents, respect and protect the human rights and democratic rights of 
citizens and residents, ensure rule of law, and provide speedy, equitable, 
cost-effective and accessible justice for all.   
The objective of the Justice System Reform Program stated in the Five-Year 
Plan for the GTP I period reads: “to comprehensively examine and reform the 
justice system and provide efficient, effective and quality services which satisfy 
the public, and in effect ensure rule of law at all levels, and ensure that the 
justice system shall render its decisive contribution to the development of a 
democratic system, sustainable development and good governance”.97 The Five-
                                           
95 Five Year Plan of the Justice Sector for the period 2010/11- 2014/15, approved on 
Nehassie 13-15፣ 2003 EC (August 19-21, 2010), Joined-up Justice Forum, (የፍትሕ Aካላት 
የጋራ ጉባዔ) Hawassa.  
96 The Amharic text of the vision reads “መልካም Aስተዳደር የሰፈነባት፣ ሰብAዊና ዲሞክራሲያዊ 
መብቶች የተከበሩባት፣ የዜጎች ሰላምና ደህንነት የሰፈነባት፣ የሕግ የበላይነት የተረጋገጠባት፣ ውጤታማ፣ 
ቀልጣፋ፣ ተደራሽ፣ ነፃና ተደራሽነት ያለው የሕዝብ Aመኔታ የተቸረው የፍትሕ ሥርዓት የሰፈነባት 
Iትዮጵያን Eውን ማድረግ ነው፡፡” 
97 The Amharic text of the objectives of the Justice System Reform Program reads: “የፍትሕ 
ሥርዓት ማሻሻያ ፕሮግራም ዓላማ የፍትሕ ሥርዓቱን በሁለንተናዊ መልኩ በመፈተሸና በማስተካከል ሕዝቡን 
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Year Plan of the justice sector further identifies seven specific objectives for the 
plan period, and it also states three sub-programmes of the Justice System 
Reform Programme (namely the sub-program for judicial reform, the sub-
program for law enforcement reform, and the sub-program for reform in legal 
education, training and research).  As the following section shows, specific 
reference to these sub-programs is missing in the current Strategic Plan for the 
Good Governance Reform Cluster.  
4.2  Good Governance Reform Cluster’s Five Year Plan during    
GTP II 
4.2.1 Strategic Plan for GTP II period and the institutions involved 
The strategic plan of the justice sector for the GTP II period (2015/6 – 2019/20) 
is included in “Good Governance Reform Cluster Second Five-Year Growth and 
Transformation Plan”.98  The second part of the document states the strategic 
plan of the Good Governance Reform Cluster during the GTP II period.99 The 
vision and mission statements refer to Ethiopia’s vision and the mission of the 
                                                                                                            
የሚያረካ ውጤታማ፣ ቀልጣፋና ብቃት ያለው Aገልግሎት በመስጠት በሁሉም ደረጃ የሕግ የበላይነትን 
ማስፈንና የፍትሕ ሥርዓቱ ለዲሞክራሲያው ሥርዓት ግንባታ፣ ለዘላቂ ልማትና ለመልካም Aስተዳደር 
የበኩሉን ወሳኝ ድርሻ Eንዲወጣ ማድረግ ነው፡፡” 
98 Good Governance Reform Cluster Second Five-Year Growth and Transformation Plan 
2015/16- 2019/20, Ministry of Justice, March 2015፣ (የመልካም Aስተዳደር ሪፎርም ክላሰተር፣ 
የሁለተኛው Aምስት ዓመታት የEድገትና የትራንስፎርሜሽን Eቅድ፣ 2008-2012፣ ፍትሕ ሚኒስቴር፣ 
መጋቢት 2007 ዓ.ም.) 
99 Id., pp. 39 – 52. The targets of the Cluster are the following: 
i. Human resource development (p. 39),  
ii. Improve organizational structure and processes:  
(a) effectiveness and efficiency (pp. 40-41)  
(b) accessibility of services (pp. 41-42),  
(c) transparency and accountability (p. 42),  
(d) judicial independence, transparency and accountability (pp. 42-43),  
(e) combat against and control of corruption and rent seeking (pp. 43-44),  
(f) coordinating activities of justice sector institutions (p. 43),   
iii. Ensure rule of law  (p. 43, 44),   
iv. Enhance public participation (pp. 44- 45), 
v. Strengthen the federal system (pp. 45-46), 
vi. Strengthen the justice administration system  
(a) criminal justice system administration (pp. 46-47) 
(b) enhancing civil justice administration (pp. 47-48) 
(c) prison administration, handling, correction and rehabilitation (pp. 48-49) 
vii. Enhance change communication (የለውጥ ኮሙኒኬሽን ማሳደግ), p. 49 
viii. Enhance performance capacity through ICT support (በIንፎርሜሽን ኮሚኒኬሽን 
ቴክኖሎጂ ተደግፎ የመሥራት Aቅምን ማጎልበት), pp. 50-51.  
ix. Enhance performance by mainstreaming cross-cutting issues (pp. 51-52). 
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Cluster. The strategic directions, objectives and targets stated in the document 
also relate to good governance at large.  
Moreover, the document states implementation strategies (p. 52), forty 
projects (p. 53), and summary (pp. 54-82) of outcomes, indicators, annual rates 
of achievement and organs responsible are set out in the Strategic Plan.  The 
summary of the goals and the organs in charge of implementation indicate that 
the cluster includes various institutions at federal and regional levels. In the 
sequence of the matrix for activities (pp. 54-82), they are: the Ministry of Public 
Service and Human Resource Development, Federal and State institutions, 
Police, Prison Administration, Federal Courts, Federal Charities and Societies 
Agency, Anti Corruption Commission, Federal and State anti-corruption 
commissions, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Regional states, Ministry of Justice, 
and Justice and Legal System Research Institute.  
4.2.2 Good Governance Reform Cluster –versus- justice sector strategic 
plan 
Unlike the strategic plan of the justice sector for the GTP I period, the strategic 
plan for the Good Governance Reform Cluster does not make direct reference to 
the ‘justice sector’ in its title. Four challenges can emerge from generic strategic 
plans that are not accompanied by specific strategic plans which target at justice 
sector institutions. The first challenge relates to the gap that will be created due 
to the substitution of the justice sector’s vision, mission and objectives (stated 
above in Section 4.1) by other general formulations applicable to the good 
governance reform cluster. Second, the reform pursuits which directly relate to 
the core components of the justice sector run the risk of being diluted (in content 
and focus) thereby spreading out thin in the midst of generic reference to good 
governance. The third challenge relates to the adverse impact of this approach 
on institutions outside the justice sector if it involves the formulation of a 
strategic plan that predominantly refers to the justice sector while it bears the 
title of ‘Good Governance Reform Cluster’. The fourth challenge can be 
susceptibility to a predominantly legalistic approach while good governance –
which addresses various dimensions of how well a country is governed– is 
mainly nurtured and honed bottom-up.  
As proactive peacemaking and peace building are more effective than 
prevention and control, addressing the elements, the sub-elements and the 
micro-elements of justice sector reform components that were identified in the 
2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program are among the factors that 
can bring about good governance, an enabler which in return facilitates the 
steady march toward the attainment of the vision and mission statements of 
Ethiopia’s justice sector institutions. It is against this backdrop that the 
following comparison is made between the justice sector reform projects under 
GTP I and GTP II that relate to the judiciary.  
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4.2.3  Sub-program for judicial reform GTP I projects –versus- Good 
Governance Reform Cluster –GTP II projects 
The Justice Sector Reform Program had fifty four projects for the GTP I period.  
The projects were classified into three sub-programs namely:  (a) Sub-Program 
for the Reform of Courts (የፍርድ ቤቶች ማሻሻያ ንUስ ፕሮግራም): 16 projects;  (b) 
Sub-Program for Law Enforcement Reform (የሕግ Aስከባሪ Aካላትን ማሻሻያ ንUስ 
ፕሮግራም): 30 projects;  and (c) Sub-Program for Enhancing Legal Education, 
Training and Research (የሕግ ትምህርት፣ ሥልጠናና ምርምር ማጠናከሪያ ንUስ 
ፕሮግራም): 8 projects. Most of these projects are inherently continuous, while 
some can be operational activities during GTP II period rather than projects.   
Out of the 16 projects of court reform, the following nine projects are not 
included among the 40 projects listed in the Good Governance Reform Cluster 
Projects for the GTP II period:   
- Judgement Execution Enhancement Project; 
- Project to ensure the constitutionality of judgements and decrees; 
- Project to enhance the system that ensures the independence, transparency 
and accountability of judges; 
- Project to strengthen Judicial Administration Council; 
- Project to formulate procedures for public assessment on courts; 
- Project to enhance and strengthen Alternative Dispute Resolution; 
- Project to support city courts, Sharia courts, military courts, and 
administrative tribunals; 
- Project to improve public defender’s services 
- Project to enhance public participation in courts. 
It is impossible to incorporate all projects of the justice sector in the Good 
Governance Reform Cluster because the cluster includes other sectors as well. 
Attempting to include all justice sector targets and projects in the Good 
Governance Reform Cluster transforms the cluster into the justice sector.  
Moreover, the predominance of justice sector elements in the Cluster’s targets 
and projects will inevitably affect the fair representation of non-justice sector 
institutions. Thus, such clustering of strategic plans can neither adequately 
incorporate justice sector targets and projects; nor can it fairly represent the 
strategic plans of other institutions outside the justice sector.   
4.3  Strategic Plan (2015-2020) of  Federal Courts  
Reference to the strategic plan of the federal courts for the five years ahead 
(including the current budget year) gives insight into the reform pursuits of 
courts that are underway. The Strategic Plan of Federal Courts for the Period 
2015/16- 2019/20 has six parts. Part I assesses the external national environment 
and institutional issues. Parts 2 and 3 of the Strategic Plan state areas of focus 
and strategic goals. The last three parts deal with the relationship between the 
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strategic goals (Part 4), Targets of the strategic goals (Part 5) and 
Implementation strategies (Part 6).  
The introduction of the Strategic Plan states that “the judiciary is the organ 
which enables citizens to enforce their human rights and democratic rights 
enshrined in the Constitution or in other laws free from the intervention of any 
government organ or individual”.100  It further notes that courts should provide 
“efficient, quality and accessible judicial services to enhance the satisfaction and 
confidence of the public”.101 In its assessment of the external environment, the 
Strategic Plan, inter alia, states the steady increase in the complexity of issues 
and the number of cases that are brought to courts in the course of Ethiopia’s 
economic development. 102  It underlines that: 
Commensurate with the pace of Ethiopia’s economic development and in the 
context of judicial independence, courts are required to resolve the issues in 
the cases brought to them by rendering efficient, quality and accessible 
services. When courts perform their functions properly, they have an 
indispensable role in attracting investment and enhancing goodwill; and on 
the contrary, their inability to catch up with economic development will have 
adverse impact on the sustainability of the development which is 
underway.103 
It further assesses current social and technological changes that need the 
enhancement of human and other resources. In the schedule that analyzes 
opportunities and challenges, the opportunities in the political environment are 
(a) the constitutional guarantee for rule of law and separation of powers,         
(b) constitutional guarantee for judicial independence and accountability,             
(c) favourable government policies and strategies, and (d) government efforts 
toward success in judicial reform.104 The challenges stated in the schedule are 
(a) erosion of judicial powers through enactment of various laws, (b) the level of 
confidence of the executive in the judicial services rendered by courts,             
(c) inadequacy in the pace of reform, and (d) attempts of undue intervention of 
the executive in judicial independence.105  
The challenges stated in the preceding paragraph such as judicial power 
erosion through enactment of various laws and attempts of undue executive 
intervention in judicial independence are inconsistent with the opportunities 
noted in the same paragraph, which include favourable government policy and 
                                           
100 Strategic Plan of Federal Courts for 2015/16 – 2019/20, Federal Supreme Court, June 
2015, p. iv. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Id., p. 2. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Id., p. 5 
105 Ibid. 
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strategy and government efforts toward success in judicial reform. Under such 
circumstances the challenges can easily cancel out the opportunities in case this 
is caused by regression in political commitment. Yet, constitutional principles 
should be able to render sufficient protection to the independence of the 
judiciary.  As noted in Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report 
2007 “there are two types of corruption that most affect judiciaries: political 
interference in judicial processes by either the executive or legislative branches 
of government, and bribery”. 106 
The strategic plan for federal courts makes comparisons of opportunities and 
challenges with regard to the economic, social and technological 
environment.107 The Strategic Plan further makes institutional assessment on the 
responsibilities and duties of courts, the strengths and weaknesses in leadership, 
human resource, structure and operations (during the preceding Strategic Plan 
period).108 The assessment also identifies stakeholders and analyzes their needs 
in detail.109  
The gaps identified are “inadequate awareness of vision and mission, gaps in 
planning and inadequate monitoring and evaluation of performance, gaps in 
effective system for transparency and accountability, inadequate staff for 
research, and gaps in overall implementation”.110 The Strategic Plan notes the 
need to address these gaps so that courts can duly play their role in the 
realization of GTP II.  To this end, eight strategic directions are identified.111 
The core themes of these strategic directions are in short reformulated as: 
                                           
106 Transparency International (2007). Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in 
Judicial Systems (Cambridge University Press), p. xxii. 
107 Strategic Plan of Federal Courts, supra note 100, p.5. 
108 Id., pp. 6-11. 
109 Id., pp. 14- 22. 
110 Id., p. 23. 
111 Ibid. 
     They are:  
i. Human resource development; 
ii. Reform in institutional structure and operations: 
a) Enhance effectiveness and efficiency in performance, 
b) Enhance the judicial independence, transparency and accountability,  
c) Combat and control rent gathering (corrupt) attitudes and practices, 
d) Enhance coordination in performance; 
iii. Ensure rule of law; 
iv. Enhance the participation of citizens; 
v. Strengthen accessibility; 
vi. Improve change communication (የለውጥ ኮሙኒኬሽን ማሻሻል) 
vii. Enhance capacity in using ICT by supporting the judicial reform by ICT 
viii. Implement cross-cutting issues. 
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-   “judicial independence, transparency and accessibility, 
-  enhance efficiency and effectiveness of judicial services,  
-  enhance access to judicial services, 
-  enhance quality of services,  
-  enhance capacity building activities, 
-  strengthen the sustainability of change management, 
-  ensure good governance, and 
-  enhance popular participation and change communication”.  
 These directions are categorized into three pillars of excellence namely: (a) 
excellent judicial services, (b) elevated performance and goodwill, and (c) good 
governance.112 In the course of pursuing these strategic directions and pillars of 
excellence, the vision of Ethiopian Federal Courts is to “attain high level of 
public confidence in 2022/23 (በ2015 ያደገ የሕዝብ Aመኔታ ያለው ፍርድ ቤት ሆኖ 
መገኘት)”.113  The mission statement reads “rendering judicial services which 
ensures rule of law (የሕግ የበላይነትን የሚያረጋግጥ የዳኝነት Aገልግሎት መስጠት)”.114  
The strategic plan of Ethiopian Federal Courts further states the following 
fifteen values: 115  
i. Independence and accountability (ነፃነትና ተጠያቂነት) 
ii. Impartiality (ገለልተኝነት) 
iii. Transparency (ግልጽነት)  
iv. Equality (Eኩልነት) 
v. Integrity (ታማንነት) 
vi. Confidentiality (ምስጢራዊነት)  
vii. Fairness (ሚዛናዊነት) 
viii. Sustained professional competence (ሁልጊዜ ራስን ማብቃት) 
ix. Responsiveness (ምላሽ መስጠት) 
x. Quality Service (የAገልግሎት ጥራት) 
xi. Readiness for change (የለውጥ ዝግጁነት) 
xii. Participatory (Aሳታፊነት) 
xiii. Rapid  and equitable judicial decisions (የተፋጠነና ፍትሐዊ ዳኝነት) 
xiv. Rule of law (የሕግ የበላይነት) 
xv. Punctuality (ቀጠሮ Aክባሪነት) 
The Strategic Plan defines the values listed above in order to enhance 
clarity.116 The mission, vision and values of Ethiopian federal courts reflect the 
mandate entrusted in Ethiopian courts by virtue of Articles 78 to 82 of the 
                                           
112 Id., pp. 27, 28. 
113  Federal Courts Annual Plan for the 2015/2016, June 2015, Addis Ababa, page 1.  
114 Ibid. 
115 Strategic Plan of Federal Courts, supra note 100, p. 24. 
116 Id., pp. 25, 26. 
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FDRE Constitution. The strategic directions and the three pillars of excellence 
indicated above are further transposed to strategic goals in the third part of the 
Strategic Plan.117  
The indicators of performance in the fifth part of the strategic plan are meant 
to be used in the monitoring and evaluation of performance. To this end, each 
annual plan evaluates performance of the preceding year. For example, the 
evaluation in the Annual Plan of Ethiopian Federal Courts (2008 EC, i.e. 
2015/16) shows the performance of federal courts in deciding cases during a 
period of seven months that were covered in the evaluation. “The Federal 
Supreme Court has rendered decision on 7,489 cases during the seven months 
that were evaluated while the number of decisions expected during the period 
were 6,748”; its performance percentage is 110.98%.118 The decisions that were 
expected from federal high courts and federal first instance courts during the 
same period of seven months were 18,417 and 47,691 respectively. The 
decisions rendered in federal high courts were 11,189 (60.8% of target), while 
federal first instance courts rendered decisions in 78,319 cases (thereby attaining 
a performance percentage of 164.2%).119  The number of decisions that were 
planned for the budget year at the three levels of federal courts were 9,640 
(Federal Supreme Court), 26,310 (federal high courts) and 68,130 (federal first 
instance courts).  
These figures indicate case loads of federal courts, and they also give insight 
into case loads in regional state courts. One of the values of Ethiopian Federal 
Courts is “Rapid and equitable adjudication”, and this envisages not only rapid 
judicial decisions, but also considers the quality of the decisions. This renders 
the other values of rule of law, judicial independence, accountability, 
impartiality, transparency, equality, integrity, etc. expedient. The number of 
cases decided during the period indicated above and the need for quality 
decisions are related with human power, budget, resources and remuneration of 
judges and other staff in courts.  While some elements of the reform such as 
judicial independence need political will and commitment to the FDRE 
Constitution, various dimensions of the reform require budget, including 
autonomy and efficiency in resource management: 
… There is increasingly growing concern about the level of competence in 
many courts which can be attributable to the unsatisfactory remuneration and 
other factors which need to be addressed so that judges with exemplary 
competence and integrity can be retained. … The judiciary can hardly attract 
and retain such judges under the current remuneration scale and prevailing 
                                           
117 Id., pp. 27-38. 
118 Federal Courts Annual Plan, supra note 113, p. 5. 
119 Ibid. 
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non-financial incentives. … This raises the issue whether a country’s treasury 
should generate revenue from court fees, or whether such fees can be 
ploughed back to the judiciary. … In the realm of non-financial incentives, 
there is the need to enhance rule of law, the independence of courts as 
enshrined in the Constitution and the tenure of judges…. 120       
5. The Notion of ‘Developmental State Judicial Policy’ in 
the Earlier Draft GTP II (April 2015 Version) 
As indicated in Section 2.2, “establishing a stable democratic and developmental 
state” was stated as an overall strategic direction in GTP I. Meanwhile, GTP I 
states ‘the independence, transparency and accountability of courts, and of the 
judicial system as a whole’. In effect, the context in which the notion of the 
democratic developmental state was used in the strategic direction of the justice 
sector in GTP I was consistent with Article 79(3) of the FDRE Constitution 
which provides that: “Judges shall exercise their functions in full independence 
and shall be directed solely by law.”   
Any policy or law which infringes this constitutional provision is void, and in 
effect, it was improper for the April 2015 version of Draft GTP II to make the 
pledge (indicated in Section 3.2.1) towards “research and its implementation in 
the creation of a judicial institution and formulation of a judicial policy in a 
manner that can serve the demands of a developmental state, developmental 
investors and citizens, and in tune with the concept of the developmental 
state”.121 
This pledge is duly omitted in GTP II.122 Yet, the issue deserves a brief 
discussion. Reference to various parts of the earlier April 2015 version of Draft 
GTP II gives insight into how the developmental state was perceived.  For 
example, the last sentence of Item 3.12 in Subsection 3.4 (titled Popular 
Participation, Democratic System Building and National Consensus) reads 
“substitution of neo-liberal curriculum by developmental democratic 
curriculum; and applying the same in the fields of legal education and 
economics” (የኒዮ ሊበራል ካሪኩለም በልማታዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ካሪኩለም መተካት፤ የሕግና 
የIኮኖሚክስ መስኮችም በዚሁ Eንዲቃኙ ማድረግ).123  The same sentence had 
                                           
120 Hailu Burayu, Elias N. Stebek  & Muradu Abdo (2013).  “The Judicial Protection of 
Property Rights in Ethiopia”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7. No. 2, December 2013, p. 367. 
121 Draft GTP II, April 2015 version, supra note 91, p. 173.  The original Amharic version 
reads “የልማታዊ መንግሥት፣ የልማታዊ ባለሀብትና የዜጋውን ጥያቄ ሊያስተናግድ በሚችል Aግባብ 
Eንዲሁም በልማታዊ መንግሥት ጽንሰ ሓሰብ የተቃኘ የዳኝነት ተቋም ለመፍጠርና የዳኝነት ፖሊሲ ለመቅረጽ 
የሚያስችል ጥናት ተካሂዶ ተግባራዊ ይደረጋል”. 
122  GTP II, supra note 88, pp. 40,41, 168, 169. 
123 Draft GTP II, April 2015 version. supra note 91, p. 177. 
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reappeared in the last sentence of Item 3.16124 which had envisaged revision in 
the curricula for the media, communication and creative arts.   
Such pledges are omitted in Section 7.2 of GTP II titled Building Democratic 
System (pp. 169-172).  Yet this notion of substituting ‘neo-liberal curriculum by 
developmental democratic curriculum’ deserves a brief clarification regarding 
the risks of using the word ‘developmental’ in the contexts of ambiguity and 
ambivalence.  
Clarity in meanings requires the synchrony between the referent, the reference 
and the symbol. In the absence of harmony between this triadic interface, any 
word or phrase (i.e. symbol) can represent different feelings, thoughts, actions or 
events (referent) unless the reference made to a word or phrase has uniform 
meaning for all members of a target audience. Such reference is said to be valid 
when the reference made to a word or phrase (symbol) by the speaker or writer 
is given the same meaning by any other person. In the absence of such validity 
in meaning, words become ambivalent and vague because they can conceal 
motives and intentions that may contradict the meaning they purport to 
represent. For example, an investor, a public office holder or a judge who claims 
to be ‘developmental’ can, under such settings of ambiguity in meaning conceal 
acts of bribery, embezzlement or nepotism in the course of his/her acts, 
decisions or orders that depart from laws, processes and procedures.   
One of the features of a developmental state is that its pursuits and the 
outcomes of development speak for themselves. The word developmental is a 
designation used by academics and researchers in making reference to the model 
of state intervention in South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, etc. (in post facto 
narrations and analyses). The developmental states of the 1960s and 1970s were 
not thus concerned with the label, and merely focused on their pragmatic policy 
content which harnessed extremist market deregulation and at the same time 
facilitated development through private sector empowerment (as opposed to 
private sector substitution).  
On the contrary, predatory states overuse the ‘development’ label to conceal 
corrupt practices in the name of ‘development’. Evans distinguishes 
developmental states from ‘predatory’ states. The latter, according to Evans 
“control the state apparatus” and they “seem to plunder without any more regard 
for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey”.125  
                                           
124 Ibid. 
125 Peter B. Evans (1989). ‘Predatory, Developmental and other Apparatuses: A 
Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” Sociological 
Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 562 & 563. 
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Evans considers the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia as 
developmental states, and Zaire [of the late 1980s] as the ‘predatory state’.126   
The notion of the ‘developmental state’ is not an economic theory or 
philosophy.  Nor is it an economic system.  It merely rectifies the downsides of 
laissez-faire deregulation, and it meanwhile avoids the Marxist model of 
paternalistic over-regulation through command economy. The developmental 
state model is a post-facto narration and analysis of the entry points, the nature, 
consequences, and the exit points of the state’s regulatory intervention in the 
operation of market forces.  In fact, the success of a developmental state marks 
its exit point because the enhancement of the private sector and institutions bring 
about a steady decline in authoritarian policy interventions and it marks an entry 
point into mature levels of free market and democratic systems.  
As Korea’s experience indicates, there is a phase of obsolescence of the 
developmental state during which its role in enhancing economic 
development outlives its usefulness because wider state intervention in the 
economy eventually becomes undue patronage and red tape, as marked by 
the massive labour unrest of the 1980s and Korea’s 1997 economic crisis.127 
The limits of the developmental state are caused by the contradictions 
inherent in the model. The capitalist class which steadily grows in the course of 
the state interventions at a certain stage regards the interventions as unnecessary 
and red tape.128 The role of the state as provider of long-term goals declines 
upon the success of the developmental state.129 The state also loses its autonomy 
due to the gradual fusion of economic interests between the economic actors and 
the political elite.130  
The policy interventions of a developmental state, inter alia, relates to the 
coordination of investment plans, the role of the state in facilitating development 
through visionary national development, and the state’s tasks of institution 
building to cause vibrant economic development.131 However, such interventions 
and other features of the developmental state are different from the Leninist-
Stalinist model of intervention. Developmental states of the 1960s and early 
                                           
126 Ibid. 
127 Elias N.  Stebek (2013).  “Overview of Country Experience in Land Rights and 
Developmental Statehood”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, No, 2, December 2013, p. 218 
128 Eun Mee Kim (1993). “Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With 
Illustrations from the South Korean Case” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993) p. 
231-232 
129 Ibid. 
130 See id., pp. 232-233.  
131  See, Ha-Joon J Chang, (1999). ‘The Economic Theory of the Developmental State’ in 
Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State, Cornell University Press, pp. 
182-199. 
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1970s did not mechanically combine certain elements of communism with other 
elements of free market economy. In spite of their wider interventionist policies 
in the path of development, they remained within the landscape of market 
economy.  As Chalmers Johnson observes:   
The achievements of the Japanese developmental state were inconvenient to 
both sides of the debate. They illustrated to the West what the state could do 
to improve the outcome of market forces, and they illustrated to the Leninists 
that their big mistake was the displacement of the market rather than using it 
for developmental purposes.132  
Developmental states did not thus substitute market economy but rather 
facilitated its effective performance. Their salient features include a strong 
private property legal regime, robust private sector, meritocratic and 
depoliticized state apparatus, national consensus, and autonomy of the state 
structure from opportunistic benefits in economic activities while at the same 
time being embedded133 in the economic life of the societies through regulatory 
interventions.  
Japan pursued interventionist policies during the 1950s and 1960s without, 
however calling itself a developmental state. In spite of such policy intervention 
to regulate market forces, “courts in Japan had formal power to review legality 
and constitutionality of administrative actions and laws” regarding the 
“protection of property rights against arbitrary governmental interference”.134 
Kahase cites Ginsburg135 and states:  
Kings of Japan … started to give the judiciary an autonomous role … since 
early twentieth century with the aim to promote economic predictability and 
generate revenue. [FN 181]. The judicial power in the protection of property 
rights and enforcement of contracts also continued during Japan’s decades of 
developmental statehood. [FN 182] 136 
In Japan, the role of the judiciary “in the economic domain and the relative 
stability of property rights and contract enforcement regimes indeed led authors 
                                           
132 Chalmers Johnson (1999). ‘The Economic Theory of the Developmental State’ in 
Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State, Cornell University Press, p. 49. 
133 The principle of ‘embedded autonomy’ refers to the balance that developmental states 
maintain in being autonomous from opportunistic economic gains of office holders while 
retaining the state’s supportive link with all economic actors (owners, managers and 
labour unions).  
134 Kahase Gebrehiwot (2014). The Role of the Judiciary in Developmental States, LL.M 
Thesis, Addis Ababa University School of Law, Unpublished, June 2014, p. 46, (citing 
Article 81 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan). 
135 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Dismantling the Developmental State; Administrative Procedure Reform 
in Japan and Korea’, American Journal of comparative Law (49), 2001, pp 585-622 at pp 
590. 
136 Kahase, supra note 134, p. 45. Footnotes omitted. 
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to note that developmental state pursuits in Japan demonstrated liberal legalism 
in the economic sphere”. 137  Likewise, the experience in South Korea (in the 
1960s and early 1970s) indicates judicial autonomy even during the decades of 
authoritarian economic policy interventions: 
An assessment of practical experience of courts of South Korea … shows 
that the judiciary in South Korean developmental state enjoyed genuine 
autonomy in enforcing regimes of property rights and contracts between 
individual actors when they chose it [FN 244]. In spite of the authoritarian 
nature of governance in … Korea, the ‘economy put first’ policy [FN 245] of 
leaders induced them to be credible to economic predictability allowing 
courts to decide civil and commercial disputes without any fear and 
interference.138 
Ethiopia pledges to pursue the policy of a democratic developmental state. 
The word ‘democratic’ is meant to distinguish the policy from the elements of 
authoritarianism that were manifested in the degree of state intervention in 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore during the 1960s and early 1970s. This is 
because the level of authoritarianism in the 1960s that was ‘tolerated’ by the 
international community in the midst of the East-West polarities of the cold war 
does not fit to current global realities. As the strategic directions of GTP I 
(indicated at the beginning of this section) shows, Ethiopia’s pledge to pursue 
the policy of a democratic developmental state is required to be in conformity 
with the FDRE Constitution thereby rendering any act of encroaching on the 
independence of the judiciary unconstitutional. 
Botswana is a democratic developmental state whose ranking in Africa with 
regard to political rights and civil liberties shows that its developmental pursuits 
are not tradeoffs to the rule of law including the independence of the judiciary:  
Democracy as well as development are processes, which require constant 
attention. To date, however, Botswana has a commendable record in the 
African context. In the Freedom House Index of political rights and civil 
liberties there are, as of 2009, only two African democracies (Cape Verde 
and Ghana) in the top group of free countries which have a higher rating than 
Botswana; and Botswana in 2009 continues to be ranked as the least corrupt 
country on the African continent according to the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International, … [ranking 
                                           
137 Id., p. 47, citing, for further reading:  Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre,and Lydia 
Tiede, Rule of Law and Economic Development, California University Press (2008), p. 
209; Tom Ginsburg, supra note 130 and Katharina Pistor and Philip A. Wellons. 
138 Id.,, p. 55 (citing  FN 244: James Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976 pp 22; FN 245:  Huck-ju Kwon, Advocacy 
Coalitions and the Politics of Welfare in Korea after the Economic Crisis, Policy & 
Politics, Vol. 31, No.1, 2002, pp.69-83 at pp 74. 
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37th out of 180 countries], followed by Mauritius (42nd) and Cape Verde 
(46th).139 
Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), shows 
Botswana’s improved rank (31st out of 175 countries), thereby maintaining its 
ranking as the least corrupt country in Africa. It is followed by Cape Verde 
(another democratic developmental state in Africa) which is 42nd in world 
ranking and is considered as the second least corrupt country in Africa.140  
Ethiopia’s ranking in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perception 
Index is 110th out of 175 countries.141  
Botswana’s standing among free democracies142 is also commendable. In 
contrast, the performance of various Sub-Saharan African countries in the 
Freedom House Index, including Ethiopia, evokes concern.  The themes that 
that are used in assessing performance in the Freedom House Index include 
political rights and civil liberties under which (a) electoral process, (b) political 
pluralism and participation, (c) functioning of government, (d) freedom of 
expression and belief, (e) associational and organizational rights, (f) rule of law, 
and (g) personal autonomy and individual rights are assessed.  
In spite of Botswana’s commendable achievements since its independence in 
1966, there are yet outstanding issues such as minority rights, fragmented 
opposition parties and relative weaknesses in civil society activities (attributable 
to the performance of civil societies rather than legal restrictions). Although 
“Botswana does not constitute the best practice model” in all aspects of the 
democratization process, there are general lessons such as the role of “a ruling 
political party to direct the trajectory of economic development”.143 Cases in 
point are Botswana’s “decision to nationalize mineral wealth” and extract “rents 
from the mineral sector to found a developmental state” and “a sound 
development planning and budgeting regime and institutions”.144 Botswana has 
meanwhile developed “a legal-institutional framework of mineral wealth 
                                           
139  Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba (eds.), The Developmental State in Africa Problems 
and Prospects, INEF-Report, 101/2010 (Institute for Development and Peace), p. 55. 
140 Transparency International <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>, Accessed: 
22 November 2015.  
141 Ibid. 
142 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015 < freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-
africa>, Accessed: 22 November 2015 
143 Emmanuel Botlhale (2015), The Building a Democratic Developmental State in 
Botswana Regional Conference on Building Democratic Developmental States for 
Economic Transformation in Southern Africa (20-22 July 2015, South Africa) 
144 Ibid. 
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management” thereby demonstrating that “resource blessings need not 
degenerate into resource curses”.145   
 Alongside the creation of a public service based on merit, Botswana’s 
political leadership also had an interest in ensuring the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy so as to allow it to pursue the country’s developmental 
objectives. Holm asserts that Botswana’s first two presidents, Khama and 
Masire in particular, ‘protected the civil service from most political 
interference’ (Holm 1996: 101) thereby shielding it from corruption and 
guaranteeing its professionalism, and turning it into a powerful agent of 
development.146 
The nature of the judiciary in a democratic developmental state can be 
observed from Botswana’s experience. “The Judiciary is independent from other 
arms of government; that is the executive and the legislature” and to “further 
reinforce the independence of the Judiciary and to ensure that it is insulated 
from interference from the other arms, the Constitution creates the Judicial 
Service Commission” that is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing and 
recommending appointments for Judicial posts”.147 Judicial Independence is 
indeed a right that citizens in Botswana “demand and enjoy”.  
Thus, the concept of democratic developmental state does not envisage 
intervention in the independence of the judiciary in the name of ‘developmental 
state judicial policy’ as it was envisaged under the earlier draft of GTP II, April 
2015 version. The risk of such ‘policy’ is its propensity to avail discretion to 
office holders to intervene in the independence of the judiciary in violation of 
the FDRE Constitution, and it goes against the independence of the judiciary in 
democratic developmental states such as Botswana. In fact, such policy would 
have repeated the fatal errors of the former Soviet Union and various Leninist 
regimes whose misperception about the convergence of the law and the state, 
led them to gross encroachments on the independence of the judiciary. 
6. Public Trust and Confidence in the Judiciary 
Three core problems were identified in the 2005 Comprehensive Justice System 
Reform Program in relation with the justice system including the judiciary. As 
stated in Section 2.1, these problems are (a) gaps in accessibility and 
responsiveness  to the needs of the poor, (b) the need for “serious steps to tackle 
corruption, abuse of power and political interference in the administration of 
                                           
145 Ibid. 
146 Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba (eds.), supra note 139, p. 47. 
147 Republic of Botswana, Government Portal 
<http://www.gov.bw/en/PrintingVersion/?printid=1854> Accessed: 20 November 2015. 
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justice”, and (c) “inadequate funding of the justice institutions” which  
“aggravates most deficiencies of the administration of justice”.  
The 2005 Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program also notes the low 
public perception regarding the independence of the judiciary and indicates that 
the power entrusted on court presidents who “act both as judges and 
administration officials accountable to the President of the Supreme Court” 
compromises their independence. The Study further states the gaps in the 
transparency of “the process of selection and promotion of judges” and their 
performance evaluation which according to the Study “lacks inputs from other 
legal professions”.148 There are some improvements in the transparency of 
selection processes upon initial recruitment at the level of lower courts. 
However, the achievements attained should be seen in light of the aspirations 
and promises of the Justice System Reform Programme. For example, 
“complaints from the business community with regard to gaps in the justice 
sector, inter alia, relate to contract enforcement”.149  Moreover, “corruption is a 
major factor that is being raised by the business community; there are also 
complaints regarding the need to enhance the efficiency of court procedures in 
order to make them business friendly”.150   
As stated in Transparency International’s 2007 Report, a corrupt judiciary 
harms economic development because “it diminishes trade, economic growth 
and human development; and, most importantly, it denies citizens impartial 
settlement of disputes with neighbours or the authorities”.151 The report 
underlines that “Judicial systems debased by bribery undermine confidence in 
governance by facilitating corruption across all sectors of government, starting 
at the helm of power. In so doing, they send a blunt message to the people: in 
this country corruption is tolerated”.152 
Although the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman and the Auditor 
General have significant contributions to good governance, the challenges of 
corruption and maladministration are still issues of concern in various sectors.  
As one of the external assessors of this article duly observed, “the level of 
concern expressed by authorities on the problem of judicial corruption in 
Ethiopia is very high.  However, a robust and targeted program of action to 
tackle it as part of the reform agenda is yet to come”. 
                                           
148 CJSRP, supra note 2, p. 14. 
149 Interview with Fekadu Petros, Assistant Professor, Addis Ababa University School of 
Law, and Expert at Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations, 25 
November, 2015. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Transparency International (2007), supra note 106, p. xi. 
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In Cressey’s Fraud Triangle there are three factors that are conducive to 
corruption. They are motivation (pressures), opportunities and rationalization.153 
In the context of a judge, low levels of remuneration and benefits under settings 
of steadily rising inflation can bring about pressures.  Any form of executive 
intervention in the judiciary can then widen the opportunities and 
rationalization of discretion. For example, a judge whose decision is influenced 
by any direct or indirect intervention from an executive official (which in the 
Soviet Union was labelled as ‘telephone justice’) can gradually incline to use 
such discretions as opportunities and rationalizations toward doing the same for 
a relative, a friend or an acquaintance.  At an advanced level of ethical decline, 
bribery can set in by gradually corroding the level of integrity required in the 
profession.  At this stage, corruption usually starts as facilitative corruption 
(speed-up bribery) to merely render rapid decision in accordance with the law, 
which can then gradually, with regard to some judges, develop toward 
corruption that circumvents judgements.  
At the Workshop on Indicators to Combat Corruption in Ethiopia’s Justice 
Sector, Ato Ali Suleiman, Commissioner of the Federal Anti-Corruption 
Commission stated that a corrupt justice system cannot provide equal treatment 
to citizens thereby affecting contract enforcement which is the core foundation 
for free market; and he stated that Ethiopia cannot attain the economic 
development it aspires and attract the desired level of investors in the absence of 
a judiciary free from corrupt practices.154  He noted that the justice system is the 
ultimate forum to combat corruption, and if corruption becomes widespread in 
this sector, all anti-corruption efforts will be ineffective.155 The workshop 
included participants from the Federal Supreme Court, Federal High Court, First 
Instance courts, prison administration, federal police, Addis Ababa Police 
Commission, public prosecutors and other institutions.  
The Commissioner underlined that if justice organs are not protected from 
various forms of corrupt practices, and unless their activities are rendered 
transparent for the public along with their accountability in the event of failure 
to comply with the processes and procedures stipulated by the law, the problems 
will go beyond the control of the justice system and can bring about national 
crisis.156 With regard to the independence of the judiciary, he remarked that 
                                           
153 Donald R. Cressey, in Joseph T. Wells, Principles of Fraud Examination, Wiley, 2008.  
154 Ali Suleiman, Opening Remarks at the Workshop  on Indicators to Combat Corruption in 
Ethiopia’s Justice Sector,  A research conducted by Justice and Legal System Research 
Institute,  Ghion Hotel, October 20, 2015. (ጥቅምት 9 ቀን 2008 ዓ.ም. ‹‹በIትዮጵያ ፍትሕ ዘርፍ 
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155 Ibid. 
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“interpretation of the law is the mandate entrusted on judges” and “intervention 
to promote individual interest in the guise of public interest should cease”.157 
After the Commissioner’s opening speech, the researchers158 who conducted 
the study (initiated and sponsored by Justice and Legal System Research 
Institute) presented their research findings and recommendations. They 
underlined the need to render court operations efficient, enhance the ethical 
standards of court employees, ensure accountability, enhance transparency, 
ensure the independence of the judiciary, and address the problems related with 
inadequate remuneration which create pressures toward corruption.  They further 
noted the need for qualified staff, better information and document management, 
monitoring schemes, avoiding conflict of interest and dealing with the causes of 
corruption identified in the study.159 
The concern regarding the level of corruption in the justice sector was also 
underlined in the Joined-up Justice Forum160 which was held in Hawassa on 
November 9 and 10, 2015.161 The Forum included justice sector organs (i.e. 
courts, Ministry of justice, justice bureaus, Police Commission officers, prison 
administration, etc.) from the federal city administrations of Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa and regional state stakeholders. In his opening speech at the Forum, 
Ato Getachew Ambaye, Minister of Justice, stated that the justice sector is 
expected to contribute to Ethiopia’s pursuits of peace, development and 
democratization.162  He recalled the achievements made during GTP I to make 
the services rendered to the public by the justice sector efficient, transparent and 
accountable, and he stated that there are still challenges in the sector that require 
substantial efforts as observed in the evaluations conducted at various levels.163  
The challenges stated by the minister include gaps in “the initiatives and 
commitment of the leadership in the justice sector, and weaknesses in goal-
orientation, attitudes, professional competence, skills, integrity and other 
problems at operational levels”.164 The minister underlined the need for further 
attention to public grievances that are caused by the exposure of the justice 
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<http://www.ena.gov.et/index.php/social/item/9066-2015-11-10-00-03-16>, Accessed: 




254                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                                December 2015  
 
 
sector to economic rent gathering and poor governance.165 According to Ato 
Getachew, focus will be given to adequately respond to the public demand for 
justice and resolve problems related with good governance during the plan 
period of GTP II.   
President of the Federal Supreme Court, Ato Tegene Getaneh expressed 
similar concerns at the Forum. He stated that there are many gaps in the delivery 
of services and good governance at all tiers and noted the need to address the 
problems of poor governance and rent gathering attitudes in all institutions of 
the justice sector so that these problems would not hamper development.166  
The discussion above clearly indicates the level of attention which should be 
given to judicial reform. Indeed, there is the need to enhance judicial 
independence, resources and facilities including substantial raise in 
remuneration to attract and retain competent and experienced judges and other 
staff.  Lessons can be drawn from Singapore’s experience regarding the positive 
impact of judicial independence accompanied by substantially high benefit 
schemes for judges. Unlike economic plans, the budgetary and other resource 
inputs in the judiciary may not provide visible statistical figures of ‘physical 
growth’. Yet, effective, efficient, predictable and accessible judicial system is 
inevitable to render the economic, social and governance dimensions of 
development pursuits functional.   
Concluding Remarks 
The academic discourse on the relationship between judicial reform and 
economic development does not deny the importance of judicial reform in 
development, but rather lies “on what makes for a successful judicial reform 
project”.167 While “some argue that reform cannot be achieved without a 
society-wide consensus”, there are others who “contend that the reform project 
can help create this consensus”.168  Hammergren believes that “institutional 
strengthening should always follow structural reforms and measures to increase 
access to the judicial system” and “she observes that institutional strengthening 
can pave the way for broader reforms”.169  Setting aside such debates on the 
cause-effect relationship between the various components and factors of judicial 
reform, it is to be noted that institution-level empowerment is one of the key 
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factors.  Such empowerment does not only relate to judicial reform, because it is 
not a stand-alone pursuit and its effectiveness envisages corresponding reforms 
in other components of the justice system as well.  
In the realm of its contribution to development, judicial reform “aims to 
buttress the rule of law and assure entrepreneurs that contracts will be enforced. 
Yet other institutions within society perform these same functions”.170 In other 
words, judicial reform envisages concurrent unfolding of other factors which 
consolidate and reinforce its pursuits. The same holds true regarding the 
necessity of judicial reform in pursuits of reforming the justice system. In the 
course of justice system reform process in various countries, there was “greater 
familiarity with the sector’s weaknesses” and eventually attention was turned to 
“measures to strengthen judicial independence, reduce politicization of the 
appointment process, and increase the professional quality of judges and other 
officials and staff and to augment the general efficiency of courtroom and 
system wide administration”.171   
As Tamanaha notes, “the Western situations in which legal institutions 
evolved in sync with advances in capitalism are totally unlike what developing 
countries face today in their attempt to leap into the global capitalist 
marketplace while nurturing legal institutions still at a nascent stage”.172 These 
developing countries need to enhance their legal institutions, including judicial 
reform in the context of unfavourable realities such as inadequate resources, 
weak governance and gaps in the legal profession. Their efforts are also 
expected to strategically aim at high thresholds of achievement along with 
engagements in incremental steady pursuits and concrete attainments.  
In an interview with the Reporter, Professor Kenichi Ohno who, since 2008, 
has been in contact with Ethiopia’s high government officials notes that ‘to have 
a fast going idea is one thing, but we want to see the quality in policy 
making”.173  He added “Japanese are always slow and steady movers. Ethiopians 
are fast movers. I think we can work together reminding each other of that. The 
speed as well as the quality is important”. He suggested that these two factors, 
i.e. speed and quality should interact in a positive way.174 A similar caveat is 
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expressed in the Ethiopian adage ‘ሲሮጡ የታጠቁት ሲሮጡ ይፈታል’ which warns 
against ‘running while dressing up’. One of the core conclusions that emerges 
from the preceding sections substantiates this point regarding the need for due 
attention to steady and concrete achievements in judicial reform.  
As indicated in Section 2.1, justice system reform, including judicial reform 
is expected to give prime focus to “measuring outcomes and impact” which is 
wider in scope than “mere measurement of inputs” such as premises, number of 
judges, ICT inputs and number of cases handled.  To this end, frameworks such 
as the five areas of performance noted in Section 2.1, i.e. (a) access to justice, 
(b) expedition and timeliness, (c) equality, fairness and integrity, (d) 
independence and accountability, and (e) public trust and confidence175  can 
inform assessments in the accessibility, efficiency and quality of judicial 
services in Ethiopia.  These five areas of performance are indeed in tandem with 
the vision, mission and values of Ethiopian courts highlighted in Section 4.1. 
The march of judicial services toward such thresholds is nurtured, honed and 
enhanced through steady and concrete pursuits and achievements rather than 
mere pledges, plans and promises.  Attainments or regressions in the realms of 
such outcomes and impact are self-evident because all these five areas of 
measurement are easily observable facts thereby becoming apparent public 
knowledge.  The level of access to justice is objectively visible in any location 
and at any court. The same holds true for the timely adjudication and decision of 
cases without undue delay. Any claim or report that negates the reality cannot 
conceal clearly visible facts that emerge from actual public experience and 
observations with regard to the level of impartial and equal treatment of parties 
in litigation, fairness and the integrity of judges and other staff in a certain 
court, and regarding the independence and accountability of the judiciary.  
Public trust and confidence emerges, grows or regresses depending upon these 
factors. Unfortunately, the level of public trust and confidence on the judiciary 
seems to be steadily declining in Ethiopia as briefly highlighted in Section 6.  
There is thus the need for a judicial reform programme which is independent 
but concurrently conducted with reforms in the other components of the justice 
sector. The independence of judicial reform does not mean seclusion from the 
other elements of the justice sector reform, but requires management of the 
reform by the judiciary itself, of course, subject to due harmonization with other 
components of the justice sector, the Joined-up Justice Forum and the Good 
Governance Reform Cluster.  
As the judiciary is one of the organs of the state, its independent reform 
needs due attention.  Nor should its budget, including remuneration scales, be 
determined by another organ other than procedures and schemes of transparency 
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and accountability. In addition to its budget, revenue from all court fees can be 
ploughed back to top-up the resources allocated for the judiciary’s projects. This 
should not, however, denote a judiciary that funds itself, because this would 
adversely affect access to justice.176  
The problems in Ethiopia’s judicial reform pursuits are mainly related with 
grassroots empowerment in the implementation of reform plans, merit-based 
judgeship, the need for substantial raise in remuneration, judicial independence 
and meritocratic judicial support personnel. In the absence of steady, concrete 
and incremental measures and achievements that address these challenges, the 
various grand aspirations and pledges for judicial reform may eventually end up 
in promise fatigue and regression.                                                                        ■ 
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